Abstract
In this chapter, I attempt to extract an ethics of the self from the philosophy of Karl Popper in the light of the ethics of subjectivity. For clarity, a subjectivist ethics may be viewed as implying that the standards for acting as well as judging actions are those of the individual. This may be taken to be informed by the understanding that while, on the one hand, ethics has to do with the moral evaluation of character and conduct,1 on the other, by “subjectivity,” reference is made to the condition of the self’s possession of perspectives, experiences, feelings, desires — all of which influence and inform the self’s action as well as judgments about reality. As such, subjectivity presupposes a subject, one that experiences all the phenomena that makes up and produces the self.2 Given the foregoing understanding, my attempt of a construction Popper’s moral philosophy is built on the foundation of his idea of critical rationalism, which finds expression in his ideas of open society, anti-historicism and falsificationism. To be sure, these ideas also form the basis of his discourse on knowledge.
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Cf. Thomas Nagel (2006), “Ethics,” in Donald M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition, Vol. 3 (Detroit: Thomson Gale), p. 379.
Cf. Robert C. Solomon (2005), “Subjectivity,” in Ted Honderich (ed.), Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 900.
Cf. Karl Popper (1994), “The Myth of the Framework,” in Karl Popper (ed.), The Myth of the Framework: In Deference of Science and Rationality (London: Routledge), p. 35.
Karl Popper (1957), The Poverty of Historicism, 2nd edition (London: Routledge), p. 108.
Cf. Karl Popper (1969), Conjectures and Refutations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul), p. 120.
Cf. I. C. Jarvie et al. (eds) (1999), Popper’s Open Society after Fifty Years, pp. 43–46.
Karl Popper (1999), “Against the Cynical Interpretation of History,” in Karl Popper (ed.), All Life is Problem Solving, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: Routledge), p. 111.
Karl Popper (1959), The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson & Co.), p. 111.
Karl Popper (1966), The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vols. 1 & 2 (London: Routledge), p. 375.
Stefano Gattei (2009), Karl Popper’s Philosophy of Science: Rationality without foundations (New York: Routledge), p. 1.
Karl Popper (1966), The Open Society and Its Enemies, p. 13.
M. A. Notturno (2000), Science and the Open Society: The Future of Karl Popper’s Philosophy (Budapest: Central European University Press), pp. 54–55.
Cf. D. Wade Hands (2007), “Popper and Lakatos in Economic Methodology,” in Daniel M. Hausman (ed.), The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology, 3rd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 190.
Cf. Uskali Mäki (1993), Rationality, Institutions, and Economic Methodology, Bo Gustafsson and Christian Knudsen (eds) (New York: Routledge), pp. 62–63.
Karl Popper (1969), Conjectures and Refutations, pp. 217–220.
Paul Bernays (1964), “Reflections on Karl Poppers’s Epistemology,” in Mario Bunge (ed.), The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy (London: The Free Press of Glencoe), p. 33.
Karl Popper (1994), In Search of a Better World Lecture and Essays from Thirty Years, trans. by L. J. Bennett (London: Routledge), p. 4.
Cf. Richard Tarnas (1991), The Passion of the Western Mind (New York: Ballantine Books), p. 395.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2015 Peter A. Ikhane
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Ikhane, P.A. (2015). Open Standard, Open Judgment and Value Revision in Karl Popper’s Moral Philosophy. In: Imafidon, E. (eds) The Ethics of Subjectivity. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137472427_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137472427_11
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-50124-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-47242-7
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)