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A Social Network Analysis of Managerial Migrations: The Case of Large Companies in the United Kingdom

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Value Creation, Reporting, and Signaling for Human Capital and Human Assets

Abstract

The enhancement of shareholder value is a focal point in contemporary financial economics because of its perceptible relationship with the company value management. From this perspective, executive managers, in particular, are deemed to be company value-adders and their performance is evaluated against this benchmark. This raises the question of how executives add shareholder value, and moreover, what makes some of them appear more capable than others to do it when firms recruit or head-hunt them.

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Meir Russ

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Arrieta-Paredes, MP., Cronin, B. (2014). A Social Network Analysis of Managerial Migrations: The Case of Large Companies in the United Kingdom. In: Russ, M. (eds) Value Creation, Reporting, and Signaling for Human Capital and Human Assets. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137472069_6

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