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Executive Remuneration

Chapter

Abstract

Concerns over levels and the nature of executive remuneration have been prominent in the press for the last decade. The ability for performance related pay to incentivise management has been questioned and, in particular, its tendency to encourage management to take risks has been considered one of the major causes of the financial crisis. This chapter examines recent research concerning these issues. The impact of recent legislation giving shareholders a binding vote on remuneration policy will be a fruitful area for research in the future.

Keywords

Corporate Governance Executive Compensation Financial Service Authority Relative Performance Evaluation Option Grant 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© William Forbes and Lynn Hodgkinson 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Loughborough UniversityUK
  2. 2.Bangor Business SchoolUK

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