Abstract
During the late 19th century, the Joseon dynasty in Korea was already weak and counting its days. The royal authority was under Chinese suzerainty with tributary relations as a guiding framework for the bilateral relationship. The Korean state under the late Joseon dynasty can be regarded as predatory and rent-seeking, marred by rampant corruption.1 The Korean elite Yangban class, comprised of officials and aristocrats, led a life of luxury at the expense of the rural peasantry. The state’s capacity to extract revenues and exert control over the powerful agrarian elite was rather poor. This weakness of the late Joseon state created a power vacuum that drew foreign powers to compete for influence over the Korean peninsula. The relative decline of agrarian China and post-Meiji industrializing Japan provided a favorable chance for Japan to occupy and colonize the Korean peninsula, which it had been trying to do since centuries. After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, and on the ruins of samurai feudalism, an industrialized-militarized Japan emerged. The Japanese quickly learned crucial lessons from the developmental experience of European countries and carefully adopted them to their own conditions. Two events — the defeat of China in 1895 and the victory over Russia in 1905 — mark a watershed in the growth of the Japanese military-industrial complex.
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Notes
The Joseon state, which lasted over 500 years, exercised wide-ranging power as a vassal to Chinese throne, however, in reality, the power of state was limited to moral persuasion and symbolically upholding the political, intellectual and cultural prestige of the state. A classic case of ‘normative centralization,’ Joseon state had only a few political activities. In other words, the Joseon state created a centralized administrative apparatus that was closely aligned with the local Yangban elites. For more details, see John B. Duncan (2000) The Origins of the Choson Dynasty, Seattle: University of Washington Press;
and Byong-ik Koh (1976–7) ‘Confucian Ideology and Political Equilibrium in East Asia,’ Social Science Journal, 4, 7–15.
The majority of officials in the colonial administration were Japanese nationals who provided bottom-up support to the centralized colonial state in Korea. For further information, see Jun Uchida (2011) Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876–1945, in Harvard East Asian Monographs, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press;
E. Taylor Atkins (2010), Primitive Selves: Koreana in the Japanese Colonial Gaze, 1910–1945, Berkeley: University of California Press;
Gi-Wook Shin (2006) ‘Colonial Racism and Nationalism,’ Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press;
Mark E. Caprio (2009) ‘Radical Assimilation under Wartime Conditions,’ in Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945, Seattle: University of Washington Press;
and Peter Duus (1995) The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895–1910, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Among the notable Korea-owned industries were: Kyongsong Cord Company, founded by the Yun family in 1911; Kyongbang Textile Company, founded by Kochang Kims of North Cholla province; Hanil Bank, founded by Min Kyu-sik; Hwasin Department Store, owned by Pak Hung-sik. For details, see Carter J. Eckert (1991) Offspring of Empire: The Ko’chang Kims and the Origins of Korean Capitalism, Seattle: University of Washington Press;
and Dennis L. McNamara (1989) ‘The Keisho and the Korean Business Elite,’ Journal of Asian Studies, 48(2), May, 310–23.
Close alignment of interests between the Korean Yangban class entrepreneurs and the colonial administration has seen them termed ‘collaborators’ who carefully promoted self-interests at the cost of the Korean national interest. For details, see Yumi Moon (2013) Populist Collaborators: The Ilchinhoe and the Japanese Colonization of Korea, 1896–1910, Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press.
Korea became part of the emerging Japanese military-industrial complex to provide support for imperialist ambitions, specifically facilitating empire-wide movement of troops that helped in the conquest of Manchuria and made deeper inroads into China. For details, see Ian Gow (2004) Military Intervention in Pre-War Japanese Politics: Admiral Kato Kanji and the Washington System, London, New York: Routledge Curzon;
Glenn D. Hook (2007) Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan, London & New York: Taylor & Francis;
John M. Maki (1945) Japanese Militarism, Past and Present, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
For details, see Andrew C. Nam (1988) Korea: Tradition and Transformation, Elizabeth, NJ: Hollym International, 324.
More details on the ‘March First Movement,’ see Frank Prentiss Baldwin, Jr. (1969) ‘The March First Movement: Korean Challenge and Japanese Response’, PhD dissertation, New York: Columbia University.
For details, see Yumi Moon (2013) Populist Collaborators: The Ilchinhoe and the Japanese Colonization of Korea, 1896–1910, Ithaca: Cornell University Press;
and Youn-Tae Chung (2002) ‘Refracted Modernity and the Issue of Pro-Japanese Collaborators in Korea,’ Korea Journal, 43(4) (Autumn), 18–59.
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© 2014 Jitendra Uttam
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Uttam, J. (2014). Continuation of Status Quo under Colonial Economic Drain, 1910–45. In: The Political Economy of Korea. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137451248_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137451248_4
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