Introduction

Abstract

In December 2011, 33 heads of state from Latin America and the Caribbean came together in Caracas, Venezuela, to formally constitute a new regional body — the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños, CELAC). The summit’s host, the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, proclaimed it ‘the most important political event to have happened in our America in 100 years’ (cited in: BBC 2011a). It was a significant event in terms of what it said about the development of Latin American and Caribbean identity in the 21st century, but it was also significant because of the voices that were not heard — particularly those of the United States and Canada. As The Miami Herald put it, ‘the hemisphere is throwing a party but not everyone’s invited’ (Wyss 2011). This indeed is uncharted territory for a region that since the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 has been understood by the United States as its own ‘backyard.’ Indeed, in Greg Grandin’s terms (2006), since the 19th century, Latin America has served as America’s ‘workshop’ — where it develops and perfects the strategies it subsequently uses to project its power on the global stage. Latin America, in other words, is a fundamental part of US hegemonic strategy, often the site where this strategy is applied most crudely and directly. The convocation of a regional body without the United States therefore represents a significant challenge to its regional and global ambitions.