Abstract
One function that was originally supporting the market and later of acting as guarantor was carried out by the ECB, promptly converted from the ‘crutch’ of banks into the ‘lifeline’ of States. In fact, the guarantee system described above may only work if the risk borne by Member States is further transferred to other players. In the case of guarantees in favour of the States, the risk is transferred to the ESM fund — a subject of international law created with a specific Treaty — and the guarantor of last resort is (above all) the ECB, where the securities issued by the ESM fund may be lodged as collateral.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
See: Bank of England, European Central Bank, The Case of a Better Functioning Securitisation Market in the European Union, May 2014.
Court of Justice (plenary session), award of 27 November 2012, Thomas Pringle c. Government of Ireland, Ireland and the Attorney General, case C-370/12. For immediate comments to the award, see: B. de Witte, T. Beukers, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. Government of Ireland, Ireland, The Attorney General, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Full Court) of 27 November 2012, in Common Market Law Review, 2013, p. 805ss.; V. Borger, The ESM and the European Court’s Predicament in Pringle, in German Law Journal, 2013, pp. 113–139;
A. Van Malleghem, Pringle: A Paradigm Shift in the European Union’s Monetary Constitution, ibid., 2013, pp. 141–168;
O. Porchia, Il ruolo della Corte di giustizia dell’Unione Europea nella governance economica Europea, Il diritto dell’Unione Europea, 2013, pp. 593–612.
OLAF award, case C-11/00, conclusions by Advocate General Jacobs–entirely accepted by the Court–§ 150: ‘as the ECB itself has noted, its independence, established as it was, is not an end in itself; it was granted for a specific purpose. Protecting the ECB’s decision-making process from public pressures in the short term, the principle of independence is meant to allow the ECB to pursue the goal of price stability and, leaving that goal imprejudiced, to support the economic policies of the Community in accordance with 105 no. 1 CE’. Then he continues (§ 155 ss.) stating that ‘the Treaty and the Statute grant to the ECB a high degree of independence that is equivalent to, or maybe greater than, the degree of independence of national central banks… However, the principle of independence does not imply full isolation from EU institutions and bodies, nor total absence of cooperation with them. The Treaty only prohibits any influence that may compromise the ECB’s ability to carry out its tasks effectively and maintain price stability; any such influence should be regarded as undue’. For comments to the OLAF award see: R. J. Goebel, Court of Justice oversight over the European Central Bank: delimiting the ECB’s constitutional autonomy and independence in the OLAF Judgment, in Fordham International Law Journal, 2005, pp. 610–654.
See F. Bassan, C.D. Mottura, Government guarantees and the European model of financial assistance to Member States, in Mercato, concorrenza, regole, 2013/3, pp. 571–603.
See: European Central Bank, Risk mitigation methods in Eurosystem credit operations, monthly newsletter, May 2004.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2015 Fabio Bassan and Carlo D. Mottura
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Bassan, F., Mottura, C.D. (2015). The ECB’s Unconventional Measures Facing the Challenge of Markets and National Courts. In: From Saviour to Guarantor. Roma Tre Business and Finance Collection. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137441560_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137441560_10
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-56135-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-44156-0
eBook Packages: Palgrave Economics & Finance CollectionEconomics and Finance (R0)