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Pitiful Giants pp 171-187 | Cite as

Conclusion: The Public Good and the Limits of the Leaving President

  • Daniel P. Franklin
Part of the The Evolving American Presidency Series book series (EAP)

Abstract

In this book I have examined presidential transitions from the perspective of the leaving administration. If there is one characteristic shared by lame duck presidents it is that, freed from the demands of running for office, they become the persons they are. If they are worried about money, they look for work. If they are in poor health, they scale back their activities. If they are embarrassed by the performance of their administrations they seek redemption. And if they fear the policies of the party opposite, they try in every way they can to lock in policies they have already set in place.

Keywords

Executive Order Term Limit Presidential Candidate Presidential Transition Partisan Politics 
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Notes

  1. 2.
    See Scott Ashworth and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, “Electoral Selection, Strategic Challenger Entry, and the Incumbency Advantage,” The Journal of Politics 70 (4) (2008): 1006–1025.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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    For a recent example of this argument for a single six-year term, see Larry Sabato, A More Perfect Constitution: Why the Constitution Must Be Revised: Ideas to Inspire a New Generation (New York: Walker & Co., 2008).Google Scholar
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    See JQ Adams’ Personal Diary in Allan Nevins, ed., The Diary of John Quincy Adams: 1794–1845 (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1928), p. 389.Google Scholar
  12. 23.
    Luisa Adams to Charles Adams, January 25, 1829, quoted in Mary W. M. Hargreaves, The Presidency of John Quincy Adams (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1985), p. 306.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Daniel P. Franklin 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel P. Franklin

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