Pitiful Giants pp 101-133 | Cite as

Leaving Presidents and Partisan Politics

  • Daniel P. Franklin
Part of the The Evolving American Presidency Series book series (EAP)


In this chapter I examine the degree to which presidents can use political clout to solidify their legacy. The problem for lame duck presidents is that throughout their last two years in office the presidency bleeds legislative and administrative power. Even for the president, who in the modern era has accrued a variety of statutory, delegated, and constitutional powers, leaving presidents have precious little ammunition left to lock in the accomplishments of their departing administration. Perhaps the best hope for presidents who desire to protect their legacies is to see that a candidate of their choosing is elected to succeed. However, for most presidents the option of choosing a successor, particularly in the modern era, is not there, and for those who have managed to choose their successor, the results have been mixed at best.


Republican Party Approval Rating Electoral College Electoral Vote Party Organization 
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© Daniel P. Franklin 2014

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  • Daniel P. Franklin

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