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Leaving Presidents and Their Relations with Congress

  • Daniel P. Franklin
Part of the The Evolving American Presidency Series book series (EAP)

Abstract

President Lyndon Johnson announced his decision to not run for another term in March 1968. Chief Justice Earl Warren, sensing an opportunity to see his replacement by a justice of a similar ideological persuasion slipping away, contacted President Johnson in June 1968 to inform him that he wished to retire. However, in order to avoid the possibility that the Senate would stall the appointment until after the election, Warren and Johnson worked out a deal such that Warren’s resignation would be contingent upon the appointment and confirmation of a successor. And then Johnson in an uncharacteristic misreading of the political “tea leaves” overplayed his hand.

Keywords

Term Limit Divided Government 20th Amendment Midterm Election Legislative Support 
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Notes

  1. 1.
    Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961–1973 (Oxford University Press, USA, 1999).Google Scholar
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    Not all divided government is the same. There is evidence to suggest that the divided government effect is muted when the president’s party controls at least one house of Congress. See Sarah A. Binder, “The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947–96,” The American Political Science Review 93(3) (September 1, 1999): 519–533.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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Copyright information

© Daniel P. Franklin 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel P. Franklin

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