Identity in Deleuze’s Differential Ontology

Abstract

Having described Deleuze’s main ontological categories, stitched them together to reveal the systemic nature of his thinking, argued that his onto-genetic account goes beyond Heidegger’s, engaged with the transcendental conditions he suggests define the various modes of thinking, and traced the various ways he tries to think the inter/intra-relationships between the various modes of thinking, the purpose of this concluding chapter is to start to evaluate Deleuze’s attempted affirmation of difference as and from difference to come to some sort of conclusion regarding how we are to approach it in terms of its success or, as Deleuze would insist on, interesting features. This is important because most commentators on Deleuze tend to content themselves with explanatory accounts of his, admittedly, difficult thinking and shy away from engaging with the philosophical veracity of his arguments. In contrast, I take this to be of particular importance, both in itself and due to the topic of this book, because, as Deleuze and Heidegger suggest, the critical aspect inherent to any questioning is central to the discursive nature of philosophy; it is this critical questioning that prevents the descent into authoritarianism. The moment a thinker’s arguments are simply taken for granted is the moment when thinking is abandoned. Having engaged in a critical questioning of Heidegger’s thinking in previous chapters, it is now time to do the same to Deleuze’s.