Abstract
The twenty-first century is often perceived as the century of personal freedom. Unlike the economic freedom of the nineteenth century and the political freedom of the twentieth century, this particular brand of freedom is seen as no longer confined to civic realms, political or bureaucratic structures, nor, in fact, interpellative of a particular moral philosophy.1 Instead it is seen as enabling individuals to choose the very standards by which to live their life. A considerably less enthusiastic account of personal freedom and, in particular, of its relation to choice, is given by the psychologist Barry Schwartz and the philosopher Renata Salecl, authors of The Paradox of Choice and The Tyranny of Choice, respectively. For Schwartz, the widespread belief that the way to maximise individual freedom is to maximise choice is an ill-fated impasse. Not only do hundreds of brands of biscuits, broadband providers, and insurance policies have a paralysing rather than a liberating effect on the individual, they furthermore decrease rather than increase satisfaction levels, much like they increase, rather than decrease disappointment levels. The reason for this are mostly ‘opportunity costs’, the fact that the decision to follow path A invariably results in the lost opportunity to follow path B.
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Notes
These parameters appear in cross-disciplinary studies of freedom in the neoliberal paradigm. See Theodore L. Putterman, ‘Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty: A Reassessment and Revision’, Polity, vol. 38, no. 3 (2006), 416–446;
Claudia R. Williamson and Rahel L. Mathers, ‘Economic Freedom, Culture, and Growth’, Public Choice, vol. 148, no. 3/4 (2011), 313–335;
John Martin Fischer, ‘Responsibility and the Kinds of Freedom’, The Journal of Ethics, vol. 12, no. 3/4 (2008), 203–228.
Slavoj Žižek, O vjerovanju [On Belief] (Zagreb: Algoritam, 2005), 124–127, translation and emphasis mine.
Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Žižek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (London: Verso, 2000), 28–29.
The Beauvois experiment was named and framed as a voluntary affair. The experiment was thus constituted as a domain of free will a priori through linguistic performativity, which, as J.L. Austin has famously argued in How to Do Things with Words inaugurates that which it states, such as when a judge proclaims a defendant guilty (J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (London: Oxford University Press, 1962 [1955] — also see Boucher’s contribution earlier in this volume). Coming from professionals behaviourally citing their profession through appearance, dress, and manner, naming is also a form of norming. When the participants were asked for the second time whether they wished to proceed, the first time being the explicitly voluntary nature of the experiment, this question was asked in an environment normed as scientific, thus essentially safe, the assumption being that the scientists would not have asked the participants to take part in anything really morally dubious or unethical. In other words, choice and free will were already ideologically inscribed in the situation, in the space, the décor, dress, and mode of address.
Richard Schechner, Performance Theory (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 32.
Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), 35.
Lacan uses the terms ‘other’ to designate the Imaginary ego and its accompanying alter-egos and ‘Other’ to designate the symbolic order, the overarching ‘objective spirit’ of trans-individual structures. See Jacques Lacan, Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. by Jacques Alain Miller, trans. by Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1981).
Slavoj Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies (London: Verso, 1997), 197–199.
In Hannah Arendt’s view, the public space, or the public sphere consists of two distinct but interrelated dimensions, the space of political freedom and equality which comes into being whenever citizens act in concert through the medium of speech and persuasion and the shared and public world of human artifacts, institutions, and settings which provides a durable context for human activities. Both dimensions are essential to the practice of citizenship, the former providing the spaces where it can flourish, the latter providing the stable background from which public spaces of action and deliberation can arise. See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (New York: Doubleday, 1959).
Susanne Piet, De Emotiemarkt (Amsterdam: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2003), 56.
Here Miller suggests that one-person branding, a ‘form of self promotion that emulates the techniques and rationale of branding’ is common practice on Facebook. Daniel Miller, Tales from Facebook (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity, 2011), 199.
Slavoj Žižek, Plaidoyer en faveur de l’intolerance [A Plea in Favour of Intolerance] (Castelnau-le-Lez: Climats, 2004), 22, translation mine.
Slavoj Žižek, Living in the End Times (London: Verso, 2011), 9.
Slavoj Žižek, ‘What Can Psychoanalysis Tell Us About Cyberspace?’, The Psychoanalytic Review, vol. 91, no. 6 (2004), 810.
Joseph Turrow, The Daily You (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2011), 3.
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© 2014 Natasha Lushetich
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Lushetich, N. (2014). The Performative Constitution of Liberal Totalitarianism on Facebook. In: Chow, B., Mangold, A. (eds) Žižek and Performance. Performance Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137403193_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137403193_7
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