Abstract
Was Britain’s decision to use military action in the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War guided by concerns for Britain’s ‘national interest’? This chapter seeks to answer this question by surveying the events of the crisis and exploring the reasons British policymakers gave for their actions. To recap the conflict in brief, the Argentines invaded East Falkland on 2 April 1982, forced a small group of British Royal Marines to surrender, raised the Argentine flag over Government House and occupied Port Stanley. On 3 April, the House of Commons unequivocally backed the despatch of a task force from Britain. On 26 April, British special forces retook the British Antarctic Survey base at South Georgia. On 2 May, the British submarine HMS Conqueror hit and sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano and an Argentine Exocet missile torpedoed HMS Sheffield on 4 May. British troops landed on East Falkland on 21 May. On 14 June the Argentine forces surrendered and British administration was restored.
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© 2014 Helen Parr
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Parr, H. (2014). National Interest and the Falklands War. In: Edmunds, T., Gaskarth, J., Porter, R. (eds) British Foreign Policy and the National Interest. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137392350_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137392350_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-48331-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-39235-0
eBook Packages: Palgrave Intern. Relations & Development CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)