Abstract
“The social world,” according to Clifford Geertz, “does not divide at its joints into perspicuous we’s with whom we can empathize, however much we differ with them, and enigmatical they’s, with whom we cannot, however much we defend to the death their right to differ from us.”1 This deep equivocality, the sense that the significant works of the human imagination “speak with equal power to the consoling piety that we are all like to one another and to the worrying suspicion that we are not,”2 exhibits itself nowhere more than in those moments of cross-cultural inquiry where our subjects seem to be conceptually deaf to certain registers of our experience that seem to be so much with us, as in the following episode:
When I first began to do fieldwork among the Shona-speaking Manyika of Zimbabwe about ten years ago, I tried to find a word that would correspond to the English concept “morality.” I explained what I meant by asking my informants to describe the norms for good behaviour toward other people. The answer was unanimous. The word for this was tsika. But when I asked my bilingual informants to translate tsika into English, they said that it was “good manners.” And whenever I asked somebody to define tsika, they would say: “Tsika is the proper way to greet people,” or “Tsika is to show respect.”3
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Notes
Clifford Geertz, “The Uses of Diversity,” in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values VII, ed. by Sterling M. McMurrin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 262.
Geertz, “Found in Translation: On the Social History of the Moral Imagination,” Georgia Review 31.4 (1977), 796.
Anita Jacobson-Widding, “‘I lied, I farted, I stole…’: Dignity and Morality in African Discourses on Personhood,” in The Ethnography of Moralities, ed. by Signe Howell (New York: Routledge, 1997), 48.
Iris Murdoch, “Vision and Choice in Morality,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary 30 (1956), 41.
Donald Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 185.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Third Edition, trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1958), §215.
David Wong, Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), xii.
See T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 7.
D. C. Lau, Ho Che Wah and Chen Fong Ching, eds., A Concordance to the Mengzi 孟子逐字索弓, ICS Series (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1995), 13.26/70/4.
David Wong, “Relativism,” in A Companion to Ethics, ed. by Peter Singer (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 445. See also Moral Relativity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
David Wong, “Taoism and the Problem of Equal Respect,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 11 (1984), 173.
Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1.
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Second Edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 216.
I employ “significant symbols” here as Geertz does in the following passage: “Thinking consists not of ‘happenings in the head’…but of a traffic in what have been called… significant symbols—words for the most part but also gestures, drawings, musical sounds, mechanical devices like clocks, or natural objects like jewels—anything, in fact, that is disengaged from its mere actuality and used to impose meaning upon experience.” I have chosen “symbols” rather than just “stories” or “narratives” or “standards” to throw a wider theoretical net onto the data. See Clifford Geertz, “The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man,” in The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 45.
Since I do not want to bias this account toward those traditions (e.g., varieties of theism, Platonism), which have a monistic structure in which a single, unifying Good forms the foundation of belief, worship, and conduct, I will use “(in)comparably higher,” or just generally “the Good,” to designate those sources of normativity which are most important to an individual or group, relatively speaking. Again, the sources of normativity that I am referring to here do not necessarily refer to transhuman realities, though, of course, they will in many traditions. For accounts that refer solely to transhuman sources of normativity in the Western tradition, see Robert M. Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002);
and John P. Reeder, Jr., Source, Sanction, and Salvation: Religion and Morality in Judaic and Christian Traditions (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1988).
By “force” I mean the thoroughness with which such symbols are internalized in the personalities of the individuals and social groups who adopt it, its centrality or marginality in their lives, and by “scope” I mean the range of social contexts within which these symbols are regarded as having more or less relevance. See Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 111–112.
Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 260.
Guo Xiang 郭象, Zhuangzi jishi 黄自己是, ed. by Guo Qingfan (Taipei: Muduo Press, 1983), 113.
Harold Roth, “Redaction Criticism and the Early History of Taoism,” Early China 19 (1994), 7.
H. Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1978), 46.
See Derek Parfit, On What Matters, Volume 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), esp. Part I.
Jonathan Dancy, “Moral Particularism”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), ed. by Edward N. Zalta http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/moral-particularism/. See also Jonathan Dancy, Ethics Without Principles (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
Cf. Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge, Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
Angus Graham, “Chuang-tzu’s Essay on Seeing Things as Equal,” History of Religions 9 (1969/1970), 144.
A. C. Graham, Chuang-tzu: The Inner Chapters (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), 144.
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© 2014 Jung H. Lee
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Lee, J.H. (2014). Hearing the Silent Harmony: Revisioning Ethics in the Zhuangzi . In: The Ethical Foundations of Early Daoism. Palgrave Macmillan’s Content and Context in Theological Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137384867_3
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