Abstract
The goal of Wittgenstein’s conceptual or grammatical investigations is the clarification of concepts and linguistic locutions we use to think and express our thoughts, with particular focus on their employment in formulating philosophical questions and answers. The purpose of this engagement with language is the resolution of philosophical problems connected with conceptual unclarities and confusions. Here the notion of a philosophical problem should not be construed too narrowly, however, as if these were problems for the philosopher only, and conceptual problems did not arise in connection with, for example, scientific thinking. As Wittgenstein remarks: ‘A scientist says he pursues only empirical science or a mathematician only mathematics and not philosophy, — but he is subject to the temptations of language like everyone; he is in the same danger as everyone else and must beware of it’ (MS 151, p. 6).1
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© 2013 Oskari Kuusela
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Kuusela, O. (2013). Wittgenstein’s Method of Conceptual Investigation and Concept Formation in Psychology. In: Racine, T.P., Slaney, K.L. (eds) A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Use of Conceptual Analysis in Psychology. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137384287_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137384287_4
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