Abstract
As the sciences of chemistry and biology developed in the twentieth century the international community, as noted in the first chapter, agreed a series of arms control and disarmament treaties aimed at restricting the use of such weapons. However, they made a far from easy or rapid progress and, as the recent use of nerve agent in Syria demonstrates, is not yet successfully concluded.1 Debate continues over why the US President called the use of such chemical weapons a ‘red line’ that should not be crossed. One reason is that such use opens up the possibility that these weapons, rather than being off limits, become an acceptable method of warfare. Then, all manner of novel weapons involving the misuse of the sciences of chemistry and biology could quickly be developed and used as the non-proliferation regime eroded.2 The 1925 Geneva Protocol may be a very simple document by modern standards but, as shown in the first chapter, it does clearly state this principle of non-use and has become widely accepted as a customary international law binding on all states.
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Sample, I. and Borger, J. (2013) UK and France pass on evidence of sarin use in Syria. The Guardian (London), 5 June, p. 1
Perry Robinson, J. P. (2008) Difficulties facing the Chemical Weapons Convention. International Affairs, 84(2), 223–239.
Dando, M. R. (1994) Biological Warfare in the 21st Century: Biotechnology and the Proliferation of Biological Weapons. London: Brassey’s. (pp. 65–85).
Sims, N. A. (2001) The Evolution of Biological Disarmament. SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Studies No. 19. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dando, M. R. (2002) Preventing Biological Warfare: The Failure of American Leadership. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Littlewood, J. (2005) The Biological Weapons Convention: A Failed Revolution. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Canada, Czech Republic and Switzerland (2012) National Implementation of the BTWC: Compliance Assessment: Update. BWC/MSP/WP.6. United Nations, Geneva, 5 December.
Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Developm ent, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (2012) Final Declaration. BWC/CONRVII/7. United Nations, Geneva, 13 Januar
Reference 4, p. 120.
Reference 4, pp. 151–170.
Pearson, G. S., Sims, N. A. and Dando, M. R. (2011) Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: Key Points for the Seventh Review Conference. University of Bradford, September.
Reference 4, p. 181.
Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (2011) Background Paper: New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention. BWC/CONRVII/rNR3/Add.l. United Nations, Geneva, 23 November, (p. 31
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (n.d) Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. OPCW, The Hague
Kelle, A., Nixdorff, K. and Dando, M. R. (2012) Preventing a Biochemical Arms Race. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Reference 14, p. 49.
ibid.
ibid, p. 50.
ibid, p. 5.
International Committee of the Red Cross (2012) Toxic Chemicals as Weapons for Law Enforcement: A Threat to Life and International Law: i) Synthesis, ii) Summary. Geneva: ICRC.
Riches, J. R. et al. (2012) Analysis of clothing and urine from Moscow theatre siege casualties reveals Carfentanil and Remifentanil use. Journal of Analytical Toxicology, 36, 647–656.
Rappert, B. and McLeish, C. (Eds) (2007) A Web of Prevention: Biological Weapons, Life Sciences and the Governance of Research. London: Earthscan.
Kelle, A., Nixdorff, K. and Dando, M. R. (2006) Controlling Biochemical Weapons: Adapting Multilateral Arms Control for the 21st Century. Basingstoke: Pal grave Macmillan.
Reference 3, pp. 1–14.
See reference 2.
Meselson, M. (2000) Averting the hostile exploitation of biotechnology. The Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions Bulletin, 48, 16–19.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2015 Malcolm Dando
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Dando, M. (2015). The CBW Non-Proliferation Regime. In: Neuroscience and the Future of Chemical-Biological Weapons. Global Issues Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137381828_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137381828_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-56761-4
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-38182-8
eBook Packages: Palgrave Intern. Relations & Development CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)