Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Privatization and Principal-Principal Conflicts in Transition Economies

  • Chapter
Shareholder Empowerment

  • 466 Accesses

Abstract

The corporate governance literature identifies two major governance models. The first is based on equity finance, controlled by capital markets, and mostly seen in common law system countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States. The second is based on debt finance, controlled by financial institutions, and mostly seen in continental European countries (such as Germany) and Japan. Because both equity and debt markets were underdeveloped, transition economies (also some South American and Asian countries) have introduced a third model characterized by concentrated ownership (Estrin, Hanousek, Kočenda, & Svejnar, 2009; Pistor, 2006). Transition economies are formerly socialist countries and are distinguished by a number of institutional and organizational features that introduce peculiar problems and may dictate differences in corporate governance mechanisms. In fact, “no other place in the world offers such ample and creative corporate governance pathologies” (Fox & Heller, 2006: 391). In particular, principal-principal (PP) conflicts, which refer to the potential expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling owners, are among the most well known corporate governance problems in transition economies (Young et al., 2008).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Aguilera, R. V., & Jackson, G. 2003. The cross-national diversity of corporate governance: dimensions and determinants. Academy of Management Review, 38: 447–465.

    Google Scholar 

  • Balcerowicz, L., Blaszyk, B., & Dabrowski, M. 1997. The Polish way to the market economy 1989–1995. In W. T. Woo, S. Parker, & J. D. Sachs (Eds.), Economies in Transition: Comparing Asia and Eastern Europe. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barclay, M. J., & Holderness, C. 1989. Private benefits from control of public corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 25(2): 371–395.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bebchuk, L. A. 1999. A rent-protection theory of corporate ownership and control. NBER Working Paper. http://www.nber.org/papers/w7203.

  • Bennett, J., Estrin, S., & Urga, G. 2007. Methods of privatization and economic growth in transition economies. Economics of Transition, 15(4): 661–683.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Black, B. S. 1990. Shareholder passivity reexamined. Michigan Law Review, 89: 520.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Black, B. S., Kraakman, R., & Tarassova, A. 2006. Russian privatization and corporate governance: What went wrong? In M. B. Fox & M. A. Heller (Eds.), Corporate governance lessons from transition economy reforms (113–193). Woodstock, Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boubakri, N., Cosset, J., & Guedhami, O. 2005. Liberalization, corporate governance and the performance of privatized firms in developing countries. Journal of Corporate Finance, 11(5): 767–790.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boycko, M., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. 1996. A theory of privatization. Economic Journal, 106: 309–319.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brada, J. C. 1996. Privatization is transition-Or is it? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(2): 67–86.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Broadman, H. G., & Recanatini, F. 2001. Seeds of corruption—Do market institutions matter? MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies, 11(4): 359–392.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buck, T. 2003. Modern Russian corporate governance: Convergent forces or product of Russia’s history. Journal of World Business, 38(4): 299–313.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carney, M., Gedajlovic, E. R., Heugens, P. R., van Essen, M., & van Oosterhout, J. 2011. Business group affiliation, performance, context, and strategy: A meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 54(3): 437–460.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Céspedes, J., Gonzalez, M., & Molina, C. A. 2010. Ownership and capital structure in Latin America. Journal of Business Research, 63(3): 248–254.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chang, S.-J. 2003. Ownership structure, expropriation, and performance of group-affiliated companies in Korea. Academy of Management Journal, 46: 238–254.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chen, Y. Y., & Young, M. N. 2010. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions by Chinese listed companies: A principal-principal perspective. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 27: 523–539.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Claessens, S., & Djankov, S. 1999. Ownership concentration and corporate performance in the Czech Republic. Journal of Comparative Economics, 27(3): 498–514.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. P. 2000. The separation of ownership from control in East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58: 81–112.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coffee, J. C. 2001. The rise of dispersed ownership: The roles of law and the state in the separation of ownership and control. Yale Law Journal, 111(1): 1–82.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Daily, C., & Dalton, D. 1992. Financial performance of founder-managed versus professionally managed small corporations. Journal of Small Business Management, 30(2): 25–34.

    Google Scholar 

  • de Castro, J. O., & Uhlenbruck, K. 1997. Characteristics of privatization: Evidence from developed, less-developed, and former communist countries. Journal of International Business Studies, 28: 123–143.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Denis, D. K., & McConnell, J. J. 2003. International corporate governance. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 38(1): 1–36.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dharwadkar, R., George, G., & Brandes, P. 2000. Privatization in emerging economies: An agency theory perspective. Academy of Management Review, 25: 650–669.

    Google Scholar 

  • Djankov, S., & Murrell, P. 2002. Enterprise restructuring in transition: A quantitative survey. Journal of Economic Literature, 40(3): 739–792.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. 2008. The law and economics of self-dealing. Journal of Financial Economics, 88(3): 430–465.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Doh, J. P. 2000. Entrepreneurial privatization strategies. Academy of Management Review, 25: 551–571.

    Google Scholar 

  • Doidge, C., Karolyi, G. A., Lins, K. V., Miller, D. P., & Stulz, R. M. 2009. Private benefits of control, ownership, and the cross-listing decision. Journal of Finance, 64(1): 425–466.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Doing Business, 2014. http://www.doingbusiness.org.

  • Douma, S., George, R., & Kabir, R. 2006. Foreign and domestic ownership, business groups and firm performance: Evidence from a large emerging market. Strategic Management Journal, 27: 637–657.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dyck, A., & Zingales, L. 2004. Private benefits of control: An international comparison. Journal of Finance, 59(2): 537–600.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dyck, A., Volchkova, N., & Zingales, L. 2008. The corporate governance role of the media: Evidence from Russia. Journal of Finance, 63(3): 1093–1135.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Estrin, S., & Earle, J. 1996. Employee ownership in transition. Economics of Transition, 4: 1–61.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Estrin, S., Hanousek, J., Kočenda, E., & Svejnar, J. 2009. The effects of privatization and ownership in transition economies. Journal of Economic Literature, 47(3): 699–728.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Estrin, S., & Prevezer, M. 2011. The role of informal institutions in corporate governance: Brazil, Russia, India, and China compared. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 28(1): 41–67.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Faccio, M. 2006. Politically connected firms. American Economic Review, 96(1): 369–386.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Faccio, M., Lang, L., & Young, L. 2001. Dividends and expropriation. American Economic Review, 91: 54–78.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Faccio, M., & Lang, L. P. 2002. The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 65(3): 365–395.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Faccio, M., & Stolin, D. 2006. Expropriation vs. proportional sharing in corporate acquisitions. Journal of Business, 79(3): 1413–1444.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Filatotchev, I., Wright, M., & Bleaney, M. 1999. Privatization, insider control and managerial entrenchment in Russia. Economics of Transition, 7(2): 481–504.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Filatotchev, I., Kapelyushnikov, R., Dyomina, N., & Aukutsionek, S. 2001. The effects of ownership concentration on investment and performance in privatized firms in Russia. Managerial and Decision Economics, 22: 299–313.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Filatotchev, I., Wright, M., Uhlenbruck, K., Tihanyi, L., & Hoskisson, R. E. 2003. Governance, organizational capabilities, and restructuring in transition economies. Journal of World Business, 38: 331–347.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fox, M. B., & Heller, M. A. 2006. Corporate governance lessons from transition economy reforms. Woodstock, Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frydman, R., Gray, C., Hessel, M., & Rapaczynski, A. 1999. When does privatization work? The impact of private ownership on corporate performance in the transition economies. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(4): 1153–1191.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fukuyama, F. 2001. Social capital, civil society and development. Third World Quarterly, 22(1): 7–20.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gedajlovic, E. R., Lubatkin, M. H., & Schulze, W. S. 2004. Crossing the threshold from founder management to professional management: A governance perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 41: 899–912.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gilson, R. J. 2007. Controlling family shareholders in developing countries: Anchoring relational exchange. Stanford Law Review, 60(2): 633–655.

    Google Scholar 

  • Globerman, S., Peng, M. W., & Shapiro, D. M. 2011. Corporate governance and Asian companies. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 28: 1–14.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goodman, J. B., & Loveman, G. W. 1991. Does privatization serve the public interest? Harvard Business Review, 69(6): 26–38.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gupta, N. 2005. Partial privatization and firm performance. Journal of Finance, 60 (2): 987–1015.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hall, P. A., & Gingerich, D. W. 2009. Varieties of capitalism and institutional complementarities in the political economy: An empirical analysis. British Journal of Political Science, 39(3): 449–482.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • He, W., Zhang, Z., & Zhu S. 2008. Ownership structure and the private benefits of control: An analysis of Chinese firms. Corporate Governance, 8(3): 286–298.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. 2003. Informal institutions and comparative politics: A research agenda. http://www3.nd.edu/~kellogg/publications/workingpapers/WPS/307.pdf.

  • Henisz, W. J., Zelner, B. A., & Guillén, M. F. 2005. The worldwide diffusion of market-oriented infrastructure reform, 1977–1999. American Sociological Review, 70(6): 871–897.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heugens, P. P. M. A. R., van Essen, M., & van Oosterhout, J. H. 2009. Meta-analyzing ownership concentration and firm performance in Asia: Towards a more fine-grained understanding. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 26(3): 361–609.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. F. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305–360.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jiang, Y., & Peng, M. W. 2011a. Are family ownership and control in large firms good, bad, or irrelevant? Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 28: 15–39.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jiang, Y., & Peng, M. W. 2011b. Principal-principal conflicts during crisis. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 28: 683–695.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson, S., La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. 2000. Tunneling. American Economic Review, 90: 22–27.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. 2009. Governance matters VIII: Governance indicators for 1996–2008. World Bank Policy Research.

    Google Scholar 

  • Khanna, T., & Rivkin, J. 2001. Estimating the performance effects of business groups in emerging markets. Strategic Management Journal, 22: 45–74.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. 1998. Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106(6): 1113–1155.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance, 54: 471–517.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lenway, S. A., & Murtha, T. P. 1994. The state as strategist in international business research. Journal of International Business Studies, 25(3): 513–536.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Levitsky, S., & Murillo, M. 2009. Variation in institutional strength. Annual Review of Political Science, 12(1): 115–133.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Li, J., & Qian, C. 2013. Principal-principal conflicts under weak institutions: A study of corporate takeovers in China. Strategic Management Journal, 34(4): 498–508.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lins, K. V. 2003. Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38: 159–184.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ma, S. 1995. Shareholding system reform: The Chinese way of privatization. Communist Economies & Economic Transformation, 7: 159–174.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Makhija, M. 2004. The value of restructuring in emerging economies: The case of the Czech Republic. Strategic Management Journal, 25: 243–267.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Megginson, W. L., & Netter, J. M. 2001. From state to market: A survey of empirical studies on privatization. Journal of Economic Literature, 39: 321–389.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Meyer, K. E., & Peng, M. W. 2005. Probing theoretically into Central and Eastern Europe: Transactions, resources, and institutions. Journal of International Business Studies, 36: 600–621.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20: 293–315.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nellis, J. 1999. Time to rethink privatization in transition economies? IFC Discussion Paper No. 38, International Financial Corporation, World Bank, Washington, DC.

    Google Scholar 

  • North, D. C. 1990. Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. New York: Norton.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Paxton, P. 1999. Is social capital declining in the United States? A multiple indicator assessment. American Journal of Sociology, 105(1): 88–127.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peng, M. W. 2003. Institutional transitions and strategic choices. Academy of Management Review, 28(2): 275–296.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peng, M. W., & Heath, P. S. 1996. The growth of the firm in planned economies in transition: Institutions, organizations, and strategic choice. Academy of Management Review, 21(2): 492–528.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peng, M. W., & Luo, Y. 2000. Managerial ties and firm performance in a transition economy: The nature of a micro-macro link. Academy of Management Journal, 43(3): 486–501.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peng, M. W., Buck, T., Filatotchev, I. 2003. Do outside directors and new managers help improve firm performance? An exploratory study of Russian privatization. Journal of World Business, 38: 348–360.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peng, M. W., Sun, S. L., Pinkham, B., & Chen, H. 2009. The institution-based view as a third leg for a strategy tripod. Academy of Management Perspectives, 23(4): 63–81.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peng, M. W., & Sauerwald, S. 2013. Corporate governance and principal-principal conflicts. In M. Wright, D. Siegel, K. Keasey, & I. Filatotchev (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Governance (658–672). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peng, M. W., & Su, W. 2014. Cross-listing and the scope of the firm. Journal of World Business, 49(1): 42–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peng, M. W., Bruton, G., & Stan, C. 2014. Theories of the state-owned firm. Working paper, Jindal School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pistor, K. 2006. Patterns of legal change: Shareholder and creditor rights in transition economies. In M. B. Fox & M. A. Heller (Eds.), Corporate governance lessons from transition economy reforms (35–83). Woodstock, Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pistor, K., Raiser, M., & Gelfe, S. 2000. Law and finance in transition economies. Economics of Transition, 8(2): 325–368.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pistor, K., & Xu, C. 2005. Governing stock markets in transition economies: Lessons from China. American Law & Economics Review, 7(1): 184–210.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Puffer, S. M., & McCarthy, D. J. 2003. The emergence of corporate governance in Russia. Journal of World Business, 38: 284–298.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Puffer, S. M., & McCarthy, D. J. 2007. Can Russia’s state-managed, network capitalism be competitive? Institutional pull versus institutional push. Journal of World Business, 42(1): 1–13.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, R. D. 1995. Tuning in, tuning out: The strange disappearance of social capital in America. Political Science and Politics, 28(4): 664–683.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Qi, B., Yang, R., & Tian, G. 2014. Can media deter management from manipulating earnings? Evidence from China. Review of Quantitative Finance & Accounting, 42(3): 571–597.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. 1998. Financial dependence and growth. American Economic Review, 88(3): 559–586.

    Google Scholar 

  • Raiser, M. 1997. How are China’s state-owned enterprises doing in the 1990s? Evidence from three interior provinces. China Economic Review, 8(2): 191–216.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ralston, D. A., Terpstra-Tong, J., Terpstra, R. H., Wang, X., & Egri, C. 2006. Today’s state-owned enterprises of China: Are they dying dinosaurs or dynamic dynamos? Strategic Management Journal, 27(9): 825–843.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Reese, W., & Weisbach, M. 2002. Protection of minority shareholder interests, cross-listings in the United States, and subsequent equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 66: 65–104.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roe, M. J. 2003. Political determinants of corporate governance. Cambridge: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ryan, L. V., & Schneider, M. 2002. The antecedents of institutional investor activism. Academy of Management Review, 27(4): 554–573.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sauerwald, S., & Peng, M. W. 2013. Informal institutions, shareholder coalitions, and principal-principal conflicts. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 30(3): 853–870.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance, 52: 737–783.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sonin, K. 2003. Why the rich may favor poor property rights protection. Journal of Comparative Economics, 31(4): 715–731.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stiglitz, J. E. 2000. Formal and informal institutions. In P. Dasgupta & I. Serageldin (Eds.), Social capital: A multifaceted perspective (59–68). Washington, DC: World Bank.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stiglitz, J. E. 2002. Globalization and its discontents. New York: Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Su, Y., Xu, D., & Phan, P. H. 2008. Principal-principal conflict in the governance of the Chinese public corporation. Management and Organization Review, 4(1): 17–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sun, Q., Tong, W. H. S., & Tong, J. 2002. How does government ownership affect firm performance? Evidence from China’s privatization experience. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 29: 1–27.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Surowiecki, J. 2012. Unequal shares. New Yorker, May 28. Available online at http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2012/05/28/120528ta_talk_surowiecki?printable=true#ixzz2Iowbq3AN. Accessed on June 2, 2015.

    Google Scholar 

  • The Economist. 2012. Emerging-market multinationals: The rise of state capitalism. Available online at http://www.economist.com/node/21543160. Accessed on June 2, 2015.

  • Tian, G. 2000. Property rights and the nature of Chinese collective enterprises. Journal of Comparative Economics, 28: 247–268.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Uhlenbruck, K., Meyer, K., & Hitt, M. 2003. Organizational transformation in transition economies: Resource-based and organizational learning perspectives. Journal of Management Studies, 40: 257–282.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vaaler, P. M., & Schrage, B. N. 2009. Residual state ownership, policy stability and financial performance following strategic decisions by privatizing telecoms. Journal of International Business Studies, 40: 621–641.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • van Essen, M., van Oosterhout, J., & Carney, M. 2012. Corporate boards and the performance of Asian firms: A meta-analysis. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 29(4): 873–905.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • van Essen, M., Engelen, P., & Carney, M. 2013. Does “good” corporate governance help in a crisis? The impact of country- and firm-level governance mechanisms in the European financial crisis. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 21(3): 201–224.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wedel, J. R. 2001. Collision and collusion: The strange case of Western aid to Eastern Europe. New York: Palgrave.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wei, Z., & Varela, O. 2003. State equity ownership and firm market performance: Evidence from China’s newly privatized firms. Global Finance Journal, 14: 65–82.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Woolcock, M. 1998. Social capital and economic development: Toward a theoretical synthesis and policy framework. Theory and Society, 27(2): 151–208.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Xu, C. 2011. The fundamental institutions of China’s reforms and development. Journal of Economic Literature, 49(4): 1076–1151.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. 2008. Corporate governance in emerging economies: A review of the principal-principal perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 45(1): 196–220.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zahra, S. A., Ireland, H. D., Gutierrez, I., & Hitt, M. A. 2000. Privatization and entrepreneurial transformation: Emerging issues and a future research agenda. Academy of Management Review, 25: 509–524.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zingales, L. 1998. Corporate governance. In P. Newman (Ed.), The new Palgrave dictionary of economics and the law. New York: MacMillan.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors
  1. Canan Mutlu
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Mike Peng
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Marc van Essen
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Maria Goranova Lori Verstegen Ryan

Copyright information

© 2015 Canan Mutlu, Mike Peng, and Marc van Essen

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Mutlu, C., Peng, M., van Essen, M. (2015). Privatization and Principal-Principal Conflicts in Transition Economies. In: Goranova, M., Ryan, L.V. (eds) Shareholder Empowerment. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137373939_11

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation