Abstract
Whatever its future may bring, the G20 has already made history in international cooperation as the first informal grouping of states that has transcended the North-South divide. This major point of fact tends to be sidelined, even virtually overshadowed, in European perceptions of the G20. Both the G77 and the G24 were created specifically to make the voice of developing countries heard, within the United Nations in the former case, and in the face of the 11 major IMF creditor countries in the latter. The G15, which grew out of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1989, set itself the objective of pursuing “a more positive and productive North-South dialogue” but nevertheless defined itself exclusively as a group of developing countries.1 Conversely, the G10 could only be a group of developed countries, discussing issues of loans and debt with debtor countries. And the G7 has always been a group of Northern countries that gradually incorporated a dialogue with the South—first Africa, and then the emerging powers—into its agenda.
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Notes
“Aims and Objectives,” Group of Fifteen (http://www.g15.org–Last accessed on October 16, 2013).
Quoted on the South Korean GO presidency’s official website (retrieved in November 2010 from http://www.g20.org.go.kr).
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As Antoine van Agtmael remarks in his book, The Emerging Markets Century, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2007.
Jeffrey Garten, The Big Emerging Markets and How They Will Change Our Lives, New York, Basic Books, 1997. The ten countries are South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Poland and Turkey.
Jim O’Neill, “Building Better Global Economic BRICs,” Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper, no. 66, November 30, 2001.
See Sreeram Chaulia, “Long Live BRIC, Welcome MIST,” Asia Times, January 26, 2011.
“Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries’ Leaders,” Yekaterinburg, June 16, 2009 (available at http://archive.kremlin.ru–Last accessed on October 16, 2013).
Ibid.
See among others Lyal White, “IBSA. South-South Co-operation with a Difference?” Global Insight (Pretoria), no. 36, 2004
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See the final Yekaterinburg Declaration (http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/ docs/2009/06/217928.shtml–Last accessed on October 16, 2013), and “BRICS Summit 2011 Joint Declaration,” Sanya, Hainan, April 14, 2011.
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Jagannath Panda “BRICS’ Sanya Declaration. What It Means to Emerging Global Strategic Calculus,” The Tribune (Chandigarh), April 23, 2011; “Libye: les arrière-pensées de Moscow dans son rapprochement vers l’Occident,” Xinhua (french.news.cn), June 2, 2011
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Christophe Jaffrelot, “India Keeps Abstaining …,” The Caravan, vol. 3, no. 8, August 2011.
Kishore Mahbubani, “The West and the Rest,” National Interest, no. 28, Summer 1992. The theory of “Asian values” has been sharply criticized by analysts of East Asian democracies, particularly the former dissident turned president of South Korea
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Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus. How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century, New York, Basic Books, 2010
Stefan Halper “American Decline. This Time It’s Real,” Foreign Policy, special issue, January-February 2011;
Stefan Halper “L’Occident est-il fini?” Courrier International, special issue, February/March/April 2011;
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Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000.
See Karoline Postel-Vinay, L’Occident et sa bonne parole, Paris, Flammarion, 2005.
See David Reynolds, “The Origins of the Two ‘World Wars’. Historical Discourse and International Politics,” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 38, no. 1, January 2003.
Edward Said, Orientalism, New York, Random House, 1978, and
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See in particular françois Duchâne, “Europe’s Role in World Peace,” in Richard Mayne (ed.), Europe Tomorrow, London, Fontana, 1972
Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe. A Contradiction in Terms?” Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002
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See among others Cranford Pratt (ed.), Internationalism under Strain. The North-South Policies of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, Toronto, Toronto University Press, 1989
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http://www.g20.org (Last accessed on October 16, 2013).
http://www.g20-g8.com (Last accessed on October 16, 2013).
Muhammed Al-Jasser, “Keynote Address,” Conference of the Institute of International Finance, National Commercial Bank, Riyadh, February 24, 2010.
“Joint letter of President Van Rompuy and President Barroso on the G20 Summit in Seoul,” Brussels, October 29, 2010, and see also “Joint Statement by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso at the end of the G20 Summit in Seoul,” Seoul, November 12, 2010 (available at http://www. consilium.europa.eu (Last accessed on October 16, 2013)).
See Annex to the letter from Permanent Representative of Singapore to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, “Strengthening the Framework for G-20 Engagement of Non-members,” New York, March 11, 2010 (available at http://www.mfa.gov.sg (Last accessed on October 16, 2013)). The 3G member states are Commonwealth of the Bahamas, Kingdom of Bahrain, Barbados. Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Jamaica, Principality of Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Principality of Monaco, New Zealand, Panama, Republic of the Philippines, State of Qatar, Republic of Rwanda, Republic of San Marino, Republic of Senegal, Republic of Singapore, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates and Uruguay.
“Statement by Ambassador Vanu Gopala Menon Permanent Representative of Singapore to the United Nations on behalf of the Global Governance Group (3G) at the meeting of the ad-hoc open-ended working group to follow up on the conference last June of the world financial and economic crisis and its impact on development,” New York, June 2, 2010.
According to the official website of the Banque de France: “La composition du G20” (available at http://www.banque-france.fr (Last accessed on October 16, 2013)).
Gary Hawke, “G20 Consensus, Compliance and the Limits of Legitimacy, East Asia Forum Quarterly, vol. 2, no. 4, October–December 2010.
Andrew F. Cooper, “The G20 and Its Regional Critics. The Search for Inclusion,” Global Policy, vol. 2, no. 2, May 2011.
Jakob Vestergaard, “The G20 and Beyond: Towards Effective Global Economic Governance,” DIIS Report, Danish Institute for International Studies (Copenhagen), no. 4, 2011.
See Kemal Dervis, “G20 Should Increase the Legitimacy of the International Institutions,” Europe’s World, Spring 2010;
Johannes Linn, “How the G20 Can Break the Stalemate in the Reform of the Multilateral Development System. Proposals for Action,” in Colin Bradford and Wonhyuk Lim (eds), Global Leadership in Transition. Making the G20 More Effective and Responsive, Washington and Seoul, Brookings Institution Press, Korea Development Institute, 2011
Paul Heinbecker, “The Future of the G20 and Its Place in Global Governance,” CIGI G20 Papers, no. 5, April 2011.
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© 2014 Karoline Postel-Vinay
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Postel-Vinay, K. (2014). The End of “The West and the Rest”. In: The G20: A New Geopolitical Order. CERI Series in International Relations and Political Economy. Palgrave Pivot, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137367754_3
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