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Probing the Responsibility to Protect’s Civilian Dimension: What Can Non-Military Sanctions Achieve?

  • Caroline Fehl

Abstract

The ritual reminder that the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) is about “more than military intervention” has accompanied academic and political debates about the concept ever since its invention in the 1990s (Bellamy, 2009; Evans, 2008; Thakur, 2002). Nevertheless, the RtoP’s civilian dimension has never received the critical attention it deserves, particularly in discussions about the international community’s “third pillar” responsibility to enforce the protection of vulnerable populations in humanitarian emergencies.

Keywords

Security Council International Criminal Military Intervention Criminal Sanction Economic Sanction 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Caroline Fehl 2015

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  • Caroline Fehl

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