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Recruitment in Comparative Perspective

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Part of the book series: Asia Today ((ASIAT))

Abstract

Because the formation of armed groups is based on the participation of individuals, the most direct consequence of combatant recruitment is the expansion of their forces. Chapters 4 and 5 examine armed groups’ efforts to collect combatants in the Cambodian civil wars by focusing on civil-military relations. Secondary and interview data reveal that recruitment potential is strengthened by the expansion of areas of control and the provision of positive and negative incentives for recruits. A possible extension of these findings is that the size of forces will likely be greater if the above variables are present. To explore the consequences of recruitment comparatively, this chapter focuses on the strength of armed forces in various cases of civil war.

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Notes

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© 2013 Yuichi Kubota

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Kubota, Y. (2013). Recruitment in Comparative Perspective. In: Armed Groups in Cambodian Civil War. Asia Today. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137364098_6

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