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Cambodia, 1979–91

  • Yuichi Kubota
Chapter
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Part of the Asia Today book series (ASIAT)

Abstract

Civil war recurred in Cambodia during the era of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-79). The preceding war and subsequent communist rule had devastated society, as evidenced in the loss of human life, the destruction of physical infrastructure, the disruption of services, increased antagonism and distrust toward the state, massive changes in economy, population displacement, the breakdown of social institutions, poor security, and extreme physical hardship and psychological trauma.1 The Khmer Rouge had destroyed traditional norms, culture, religion, organizations, networks, and families. After the collapse of Democratic Kampuchea in 1979, the Heng Samrin administration began reconstructing society through collectivist cooperatives, a means by which the Khmer Rouge had also attempted to transform the economy even more radically.

Keywords

Border Area Refugee Camp Armed Group Government Military Khmer Rouge 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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© Yuichi Kubota 2013

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