Theory: Territorial Control, Rivalry, and Recruitment

  • Yuichi Kubota
Part of the Asia Today book series (ASIAT)


The literature on civil war recruitment has advanced our understanding of how armed forces mobilize combatants. The most recent theories (i.e., organization theories of recruitment and theories of control), in particular, have drawn our attention to the recruitment strategies of armed forces and the diversity of contexts in civil war. However, assumptions in these theories still need to be reframed so that we can capture both the spectrum of voluntary to involuntary combatant recruitment and the variety in civilian responses according to environment. Acknowledging these gaps in the existing literature, this chapter aims to establish a theory pertaining to combatant recruitment by armed forces during civil war. For this purpose, the following sections relate key findings and introduce critical associations for theoretical consideration, including the rivalry between government and rebel forces, armed forces’ control and violence, and coercive and noncoercive civil-military relations. In addition, this chapter emphasizes the idea that participants in armed forces are not homogeneous across contexts and that there are those who act differently from what current theories of control assume.


Armed Force Armed Group Collective Action Problem Coercive Measure Mobilization Strategy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Yuichi Kubota 2013

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