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Introduction

  • Yuichi Kubota
Chapter
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Part of the Asia Today book series (ASIAT)

Abstract

The purpose of this book is to explore the multiplicity of mobilization strategies that an armed group undertakes in the competitive relationship with its opponents in civil war. The recruitment of combatants who engage in military activities by investing their energies and resources is one of the major tasks for civil war groups because the size of their forces holds significant meaning. While civilians may passively tolerate a group’s presence by refraining from taking any action against it or by covertly providing assistance with intelligence and logistical support, a small population of civilians might assume a more active and overt engagement in military activities through membership in the group. Armed groups seek to recruit qualified, committed, and able combatants whose interests coincide with the groups’ long-term goals, but environments do not often allow them to do so. The groups often encounter an urgent need to recruit troops due to the loss of combatants in the battlefield or from desertion. However, their attempts at recruitment are made difficult by the war itself (e.g., decrease in and displacement of the population). Under limited conditions, however, the groups pursue possible recruitment strategies and mix some of these strategies to mobilize such combatants as long as the groups are able to exercise effective control over their members.

Keywords

Armed Force Military Activity Armed Group Khmer Rouge Mobilization Strategy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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© Yuichi Kubota 2013

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