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Abstract

Writing in November 1942, an exasperated Lord Linlithgow (the longest-serving Viceroy of India), lamented how he had been unable to implement short cuts and easy solutions to the problems of the Cripps Mission, ‘Quit India’, and the search for a new Viceroy. The ‘hard fact’ which confronted Churchill was that the issue of Indian self-government was back on the table in 1942, for the allied war effort and American sentiment ensured that it could no longer be ignored. As the Japanese Army advanced towards India, the British Empire’s wartime struggle for power in the Far East was not just against the encroaching Imperial Army — it was a struggle against the left in Britain, against Indian nationalism, and against American anti-imperialism. Since Churchill’s pre-war views on the issue of Indian self-government were notorious — his views had ‘chained him to the back benches’ for much of the 1930s — when it came to his memoirs, the question was not whether his ‘curious complex about India’ would taint his portrayal, but rather how could he narrate this part of his tale without it having a detrimental effect upon his present or future?2

We have got to the point … in the Indian situation in which shortcuts are no good and … we have to face the hard facts.1

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Notes

  1. Nicholas Mansergh and E.W.R. Lumby (eds), Transfer of Power: Volume III, Reassertion of Authority, Gandhi’s fast, and the succession to the Viceroyalty, 21 September 1942–12 June 1943 (London: HMSO, 1971), Linlithgow to Amery, 1 November 1942, p. 183.

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  2. Robin James Moore, Churchill, Cripps, and India: 1939–1945 (Oxford: OUP, 1979), p. 1; Penderel Moon (ed.), Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal (Karachi: OUP, 1974), p. 3.

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  3. For nuanced accounts of Cripps in Moscow see: Peter Clarke, The Cripps Version: The Life of Sir Stafford Cripps 1889–1952 (London: Allen Lane, 2002), pp. 183–241; and Gabriel Gorodetsky, Stafford Cripps’ Mission to Moscow, 1940–1942 (Cambridge: CUP, 1984).

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  4. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volume III, The Grand Alliance (London: Cassell, 1950), pp. 315–52. Churchill’s account was inaccurate in that Cripps replied to him explaining why he delayed delivery of the telegramon the 5 April and not, as Churchill maintained, on 12 April 1941. Clearly not everyone thought of Cripps as a failure in Moscow: ‘We ally ourselves with the USSR at last! Cripps must have been doing excellent work’. Mass-Observation contributor, Maggie Joy Blunt (writer), in Sandra Koa Wing (ed.), Mass-Observation: Britain in the Second World War (London: Folio Society, 2007), entry dated 22 July 1941, p. 100.

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  6. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volume IV, Hinge of Fate (London: Cassell, 1951). The chapter is in Book I, ‘The Onslaught of Japan’, pp. 181–96.

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  7. Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, Its Officers and Men (London: Macmillan, 1986), p. 471.

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  11. Roosevelt was not the only American who attempted to persuade Churchill to approach the situation in India differently. American liberal intellectuals had been agitating during the inter-war years with the same aim in mind. Although not entirely successful in their remit, ‘if they did not hearten the struggle in India, they at least provided it with a voice in the West that nationalist leaders welcomed’. Alan Raucher, ‘American Anti-Imperialists and the Pro-India Movement, 1900–1932’, Pacific Historical Review, 43/1 (1974), p. 110.

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  15. Churchill was not the only man to think this of Cripps. Lord Beaverbrook, William Maxwell Aitken (1879–1964), the press baron and MP for Ashton-under-Lyne, said that Cripps had ‘the genius of the untried’. By which he meant that Cripps was ‘a very able man indeed but, you know, he has his defects; he is in some ways difficult’. Beaverbrook to Crozier, 16 March 1942, in A.J.P. Taylor (ed.), Off the Record: W.P. Crozier, Political Interviews, 1933–1943 (London: Hutchinson, 1973), p. 306. Cripps was disparagingly described as a man who had to make an appointment to get the joke.

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  18. Attempts to reconcile Congress with Jinnah’s Moslem League had been made by non-parliamentary and non-governmental bodies. One such example, in early 1942, was Mr Horace Alexander, of the Friends Service Council of London and Dublin, who had sent a letter to Amery ‘congratulating him on the release of Congress prisoners and forwarding information on the efforts made by the All-India Conference of Indian Christians to bring about a reconciliation between the leaders of the various parties’. See Transfer of Power: I, fn. 9, p. 18. Unsurprisingly, Churchill’s account of the era leading up to the Cripps Mission ignores such British-led attempts as it would question his portrayal. For Indian approaches as mediation, especially Sapru’s, see David A. Low, ‘The Mediator’s Moment: Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and the Antecedents to the Cripps Mission to India, 1940–42’, in R.F. Holland and G. Rizvi (eds), Perspectives on Imperialism and Decolonization: Essays in Honour of A.F. Madden (London: Cass, 1984), pp. 146–64.

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© 2014 Catherine A.V. Wilson

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Wilson, C. (2014). Churchill’s India, 1942 to 1943. In: Churchill on the Far East in The Second World War. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137363954_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137363954_6

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

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