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No Non-Sense without Imagination: Schizophrenic Delusion as Reified Imaginings Unchallengeable by Perception

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Book cover Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making

Part of the book series: New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science ((NDPCS))

Summary

Psychopathology of schizophrenia is presented as a core issue for an enactive theory that is confronted by non-sense. The core disturbance of schizophrenia has been recently identified with disembodiment: a lack, or weakening, of sensory-motor self-awareness. The problem of the transition from prodromal disembodiment to acute schizophrenic symptoms (hallu- cinations and delusions) is discussed. A phenomenological psychology of imagination turns out to be necessary to explain this transition and to conceive of schizophrenic delusion as reified imaginings unchallenge- able by perception. The enactive approach to the psychopathology of schizophrenia shows that there can be no radical experience of non-sense without imagination, but also that imagination is a crucial faculty to make sense of non-sense in embodied and embedded psychotherapies.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Humanities Department , Amedeo Avogadro University, Italy

    Daria Dibitonto (postdoctoral research position in Moral Philosophy)

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  1. Daria Dibitonto
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. United Arab Emirates University, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

    Massimiliano Cappuccio

  2. Universidad National Auionoma de Mexico, Mexico

    Tom Froese

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© 2014 Daria Dibitonto

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Dibitonto, D. (2014). No Non-Sense without Imagination: Schizophrenic Delusion as Reified Imaginings Unchallengeable by Perception. In: Cappuccio, M., Froese, T. (eds) Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making. New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137363367_8

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