Abstract
Writers of military history have often been keen to highlight missed opportunities in the campaigns and battles that they discuss. Indeed, there is a whole genre of military history books devoted to showing how campaigns and battles could have been much better conducted. Unfortunately, these works usually fail to acknowledge adequately the great benefit of hindsight and will often ignore many confounding factors in the original scenario. Perhaps no war has had so many alleged missed opportunities as the First World War. This chapter will consider whether there were any missed opportunities connected with the first combat engagement of the French tanks on 16 April 1917, including a consideration of a number of criticisms made about the engagement by Heinz Guderian, the German armour expert.1 The tank engagement was widely seen as a failure at the time and afterwards; for example, Guderian argues in his 1937 book Ach hing Panzer that the French tanks should have given a much better showing on 16 April 1917. To claim this engagement was a missed opportunity, as Guderian does, is to strongly imply that there was a failure of vision, but this case study will show that it was not any lack of imagination in the tank officers’ plans but the hard reality of immature technology and a misjudged approach by the French commander-in-chief General Robert Nivelle to the offensive in general that caused the tank attack to fail.
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Notes
Heinz Guderian, Achtung Panzer, reprint, translated by Christopher Duffy (London: Cassell, 1937).
See Robert Allan Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War (London: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 318–345.
Although in practice the frontages were somewhat wider; see Charles-Maurice Chenu, Du Kepi Rouge aux Chars d’Assaut (Paris: Albin-Michel, 1932), p. 232.
Marcel Fourier and Maurice Gagneur, Avec les chars d’assaut (Paris: Hachette, 1919), p. 4.
Quoted in Colonel E Ramspacher, Le General Estienne: Père des Chars (Paris: Editions Lavauzelle, 1983), p. 61.
See Tim Gale, The French Army’s Tank Force and Armoured Warfare in the Great War (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 62–65.
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© 2014 Tim Gale
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Gale, T. (2014). Missed Opportunity? The French Tanks in the Nivelle Offensive. In: Krause, J. (eds) The Greater War. Studies in Military and Strategic History. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137360663_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137360663_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-137-36064-9
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