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Bubbles and Contagion in Financial Markets, Volume 1 pp 55–89Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Contributors to the Bubble Formation and Contagion Process

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Abstract

There is no agreed-upon, finite, and comprehensive list of “culprit” variables responsible for the creation of bubbles; instead, evidence suggests there are many contributing factors. For instance, in addition to factors pertaining to particular economic conditions and monetary policy (the low interest rates, easy credit, and transmission mechanisms discussed in Chapter 2), there are variables that relate to market imperfections as well as the collective behavior that prevails during such events.

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  1. Spain

    Eva R. Porras (Independent scholar)

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  1. Eva R. Porras
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© 2016 Eva R. Porras

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Porras, E.R. (2016). Contributors to the Bubble Formation and Contagion Process. In: Bubbles and Contagion in Financial Markets, Volume 1. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137358769_3

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