Abstract
In the first two chapters of Part 1, we have argued (i) that a commitment to the existence of authoritative rational intuitions is rationally obligatory, and (ii) that the experimentalist critique of intuitions not only fails to have any critical purchase on a theory of authoritative rational intuitions but in fact presupposes their indispensability. The present chapter goes after similar neo-rationalist conclusions, but from a somewhat different point of view.
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© 2013 Andrew Chapman, Addison Ellis, Robert Hanna, Tyler Hildebrand, HenryW. Pickford
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Hildebrand, T. (2013). Rational Intuitions and Analytic Metaphysics. In: In Defense of Intuitions. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137347954_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137347954_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-46756-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-34795-4
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)