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Thought Experiments and Experimental Philosophy

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The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods

Abstract

In recent years, there has been a lot of debate in philosophical methodology about the best rational reconstruction of philosophical thought experiments. Concerning this debate, I will first argue against the current consensus that our intuitive judgments about Gettier thought experiments should be interpreted in modal terms.

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Authors
  1. Joachim Horvath
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Manchester, UK

    Chris Daly

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© 2015 Joachim Horvath

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Horvath, J. (2015). Thought Experiments and Experimental Philosophy. In: Daly, C. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137344557_16

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