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Intuitions, Conceptual Engineering, and Conceptual Fixed Points

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The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods

Abstract

This chapter will be in three parts: the first part concerns the reliability of intuitions, the second part concerns the idea of philosophy as conceptual engineering, and the third deals with certain possible limits to the idea of conceptual engineering, or what I will call conceptual fixed points. Let me begin with a roadmap.

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Authors
  1. Matti Eklund
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Manchester, UK

    Chris Daly

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© 2015 Matti Eklund

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Eklund, M. (2015). Intuitions, Conceptual Engineering, and Conceptual Fixed Points. In: Daly, C. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137344557_15

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