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Introduction and Historical Overview

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The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods

Abstract

Philosophy is highly speculative. Yet not anything goes in philosophy: it is not a matter of thinking or saying whatever takes your fancy. Philosophers have standards to keep. They seek to evaluate and grade their speculations. Some speculations are assigned higher credences — are judged to be more likely — than others. But on what basis is this done? What distinguishes philosophy from sheer or idle speculation is the fact that philosophers argue about their speculations. Philosophy then involves two components: in speculating it devises interesting, novel, and general claims; and in arguing it provides persuasive reasons for accepting (or rejecting) those claims. The centrality of the role of argument in philosophy raises at least three questions.

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Daly, C. (2015). Introduction and Historical Overview. In: Daly, C. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137344557_1

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