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Minting New COIN: Critiquing Counter-insurgency Theory

  • Celeste Ward Gventer
  • David Martin Jones
  • M. L. R. Smith
Part of the Rethinking Political Violence series book series (RPV)

Abstract

Over the last half-decade, counter-insurgency (COIN) rose to prominence as the dominant paradigm in American and British thinking about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and indeed for the presumed wars of the future. ‘COIN’ achieved such currency in the strategic community that it became more than a military doctrine, which is its nominal status. Instead, it became a universal panacea. It offered a strategy, a theory of warfare, a movement in defence and military circles, and a ‘how to’ guide for implementing an interventionist American and allied foreign policy, informed by a seemingly humanitarian orientation.1

Keywords

Armed Conflict Field Manual Critical Perspective Counterinsurgency Strategy North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Celeste Ward Gventer, David Martin Jones and M.L.R. Smith 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Celeste Ward Gventer
  • David Martin Jones
  • M. L. R. Smith

There are no affiliations available

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