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The Military Utility and Interventions Post-Afghanistan: Reassessing Ends, Ways, and Means

  • Matthew Ford
Part of the Rethinking Political Violence series book series (RPV)

Abstract

Whereas the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers seemed to demonstrate the ineffective nature of deterrence theory, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan appear to have undermined the efficacy of counter-insurgency (COIN). The result is a military instrument that in many respects not only looks to be hampered by a relative decline in funding among a number of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) powers but, more fundamentally, now also lacks a clarity of purpose that suggests other forms of state power have more utility. To be sure, a number of scholars have pointed out that brute force may well have the virtue of focusing our adversaries’ minds on whether they wish to continue along a particular course of action.1 However, the application of state violence also has the potential to undermine the human security values Western powers typically use to frame their objectives.2

Keywords

United Nations Security Council Situational Awareness Critical Perspective Human Security 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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© Matthew Ford 2014

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  • Matthew Ford

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