New Relativism: Epistemic Aftermath

Abstract

This chapter begins by qualifying the epistemologically oriented objections raised in the previous chapter against MacFarlane’s (2005; 2009; 2014) ‘new epistemic relativism’. These objections are conceded not to be ultimately decisive against the view unless we can further defend them to be worse theoretical costs than the costs that are incurred by other competing semantics for knowledge attributions. Rather than to attempt to establish this point about comparative costs, I opt in this chapter for an entirely different kind of rationale on the basis of which it will be argued that any import new epistemic relativism might lay claim to having in epistemology is ultimately undermined. The rationale advanced to this end involves putting together several pieces, though the overarching move can be stated simply: I suggest, in a fashion that draws some close parallels with Allan Hazlett’s (2010) recent work on knowledge, factivity and knowledge ascriptions, that the more compelling MacFarlane’s argument is for his conclusion that the ordinary concept ‘knows’ is assessment-sensitive, the more reason the epistemologist has for thinking that the ordinary concept of knowledge is epistemologically uninteresting, and moreover, so are ordinary knowledge ascriptions. Crucial to the line advanced here will be an examination of what contemporary epistemology might look like if it were centred around an assessment-sensitive concept of knowledge.