Abstract
The September 11 attacks on the US homeland coupled with the 2001 anthrax attacks presented a new and dynamic threat that our Cold War era institutions were ill suited to deal with. Pressing concerns grew over the prospect of terrorism on a scale never deemed credible in the past and concern arose over the ability of the United States to effectively respond to these larger-scale terror attacks. Following 9/11, the capacity to launch large-scale attacks with catastrophic effects, particularly those involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), appeared no longer limited to states with advanced technological infrastructures. As Aum Shinrikyo demonstrated as far back as 1995 by conducting a sarin attack on the Tokyo subways system, WMD attacks were possible and could be undertaken by small, organized terror cells or even by lone individuals. The convergence of the availability of capabilities to inflict mass casualties with the intent to do so had arrived. From advances in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals to the prevalence of chemical manufacturing and widespread availability of radiological materials such as cesium, the threat was viewed in the aftermath of September 11 and continues to be viewed today as increasingly global and dynamic, blurring criminal intent with national security consequences. This makes fashioning an effective response to protect the US homeland highly complex.
The threats to our people, our homeland, and our interests have shifted dramatically in the last 20 years. Competition among states endures, but instead of a single nuclear adversary, the United States is now threatened by the potential spread of nuclear weapons to extremists who may not be deterred from using them. Instead of a hostile expansionist empire, we now face a diverse array of challenges, from a loose network of violent extremists to states that flout international norms or face internal collapse. This Administration has no greater responsibility than protecting the American people.
—National Security Strategy, 2010
From 2006 through 2011, the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University in Washington, DC conducted a broad study on
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Notes
The White House, National Security Strategy, May 2010, p. 20.
The White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011, p. 3.
US Department of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security Strategic Goal: Fiscal Years 2012–2016, February 2012, p. 19.
Office of the President, Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security, October 2007, p. 1.
Joint Publication 3–27, Homeland Defense, July 12, 2007, p. A-3, at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_27.pdf.
Steve Bowman, Homeland Security: The Department of Defense’s Role, Report for Congress, RL31615, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, May 14, 2003.
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© 2013 Jeffrey A. Larsen
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Love, R.A. (2013). Homeland Security and Homeland Defense. In: Larsen, J.A. (eds) Responding to Catastrophic Events. Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137336439_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137336439_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
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