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Queen Elizabeth II and the Economists

  • Dimitris N. Chorafas
Chapter

Abstract

On November 5, 2008, not quite two months after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the Western economy’s descent to the abyss, Queen Elizabeth II inaugurated a new building at the London School of Economics. Referring to the financial crisis, she asked the professors: “Why did nobody notice it?” The faculty was caught off guard. Among prominent apologies, the Queen received a letter signed by renowned British economists stating:

In summary, extent and severity of the crisis and to head it off, while it had many causes, was principally a failure of the collective imagination of many bright people, both in this country and internationally, to understand the risks to the system as a whole.1

Keywords

Monetary Policy Central Bank Hedge Fund London School Sovereign Debt 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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© Dimitris N. Chorafas 2013

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  • Dimitris N. Chorafas

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