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Framing the Revolution as a Cold War Crisis

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Abstract

Given Iran’s long-standing importance to US Cold War strategy, and the worrying decline in US—Soviet relations, it was inevitable that the Iranian Revolution would be framed as a Cold War crisis. At the same time, Carter was being told by some of his advisors, including Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Brzezinski, that ‘the trend in strategic forces has favoured the Soviet Union since the mid 1960s’.1 Richard Lehman, chairman of the National Intelligence Council, warned that ‘Even without Iran, the power balance will be exceptionally delicate in the early to mid 1980s. In this period Soviet military strength will grow substantially relative to that of the US.’2 The week before Khomeini landed in Tehran, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff David Jones stressed the danger of Soviet advances in strategic and conventional forces and asked Congress to support an increase in military spending. Presenting his military posture statement for FY 1980, Jones warned that the Soviet emphasis on military power threatened to upset the delicate balance of stability in the global power arena.3

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Notes

  1. James G. Blight and Janet M. Lang, ‘When Empathy Failed Using Critical Oral History to Reassess the Collapse of U.S.—Soviet Détente in the Carter—Brezhnev Years’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Spring 2010), 58–59.

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  14. Mottahedeh, 291. For the intellectuals’ perception of the Tudeh in the 1940s, see Homa Katouzian, Sadeq Hedayat: The Life and Literature of an Iranian Writer (London, 1991), 162–163. Jalal Al-e-Ahmad, who has come to be considered the ‘leading spokesman for the non-establishment Iranian intelligentsia’, has been written about extensively. See Michael Hillmann, ‘Cultural Dilemmas of an Iranian Literary Intellectual,’ in Iranian Culture: A Persianist View (London, 1990), 119–144; Brad Hanson, ‘The Westoxication of Iran: Depictions and Reactions of Beh-rangi, Al-e Ahmad and Shariati’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (February 1983): 1–23

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© 2013 Christian Emery

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Emery, C. (2013). Framing the Revolution as a Cold War Crisis. In: US Foreign Policy and the Iranian Revolution. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137329875_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137329875_3

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-349-46072-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-137-32987-5

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