Defence of the Realm

Abstract

During July, Hugh Carless assumed the thankless job of chargé d’affaires in Buenos Aires. He spent his first few weeks writing of Argentine dismay at the outcome of Rome. Allara suspected that British diplomats were already ‘playing for time’, and Carless was gloomy about the prospects: ‘I believe that, unless progress on some aspect of sovereignty can be achieved at the next round in November, there is a probability that they will consider whether to switch from a policy of negotiation to a policy of pressure.’¹ This was not an isolated report. On 11 August he expressed concern about a possible Argentine reoccupation of Southern Thule. In February the former foreign minister, César Guzzetti, had ‘promised’ that the base would be evacuated at the end of the Antarctic summer. But as the winter days lengthened, Carless reported that the government was advancing plans for scientific and naval operations.² Increasingly, the navy commander-in-chief was calling the military tune. ‘Towering above the Foreign Ministry is the figure of Massera: vigorous, ambitious and constantly on the move in this country and to neighbouring capitals’, Carless warned.³ The prospect of an Argentine naval attack would soon weigh heavily on British policymakers, dominating concerns ahead of the negotiations.