Abstract
In Chapter 4 we observed that, if we actually do, and accomplish, much of what we think we do, we exercise power to choose in the following sense: We engage in conduct knowingly when aware of being able to behave in alternative ways on that occasion (see Section 4.4). We saw that much of the conduct we think we engage in is chosen. At the same time, much of this conduct is voluntary.
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Notes
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© 2014 Jason Douglas Runyan
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Runyan, J.D. (2014). Choices and Voluntary Conduct. In: Human Agency and Neural Causes. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137329493_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137329493_6
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