Liberal Communitarianism from a Global Perspective

  • John Charvet


On the theory of ethics propounded in this work individuals have rights and duties only as members of a collection of people who are mutually engaged to interact on ethical principles. They thereby, bind themselves to treat one another as ends — not in themselves but for one another — and hence to give equal consideration to the interests of each in the determination of the substantive ethical terms of their interaction. Ethics, on this view, is essentially reciprocal. There are no absolute or unconditional principles that require individuals to do virtuous acts independently of whatever anyone else does.


Liberal State Ethical Content Equal Consideration Human Equality Liberal Principle 
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  1. 2.
    See David Miller’s comments on world government in D. Miller (2007), National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 25–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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    I have discussed the difference between a society and system of states with special reference to Europe in J. Charvet and E. Kaczynska-Nay (2008), The Liberal Project and Human Rights: The Theory and Practice of a New World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 42–58.Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© John Charvet 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • John Charvet
    • 1
  1. 1.London School of EconomicsUK

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