Introduction

Abstract

During the 1990s the concept and phenomenon of the failed state achieved considerable influence amongst journalists, academics and policy makers and their advisers. There is no agreed definition but the following is typical: a failed state is characterised by the ‘collapse of central government to impose order, resulting in loss of physical control of territory, and/or the monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Crucially, it can no longer reproduce the conditions for its own existence’ (GSDRC 2012). The intellectual and policy impact of state failure has been considerable and remains influential in new guises (e.g. the fragile state); its legacy can be seen in many parts of world. Developed as an explanation for post-Cold War politics and the new world (dis)order, the failed state became a key discourse in the conduct of international politics. This was particularly so after the 9/11 attacks on the US:

The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murders. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states unable to resist terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.

(Bush 2002, iv)