Towards a Political Morality of Uncertainty

Abstract

At the end of the previous chapter, we asked whether the imperative to care for the future can encompass more than the futures of whatever specific objects of attachment we simply happen to care about. We may readily agree that the fact of attachment gives rise to a responsibility to care for whatever object of attachment one is concerned with. But is this not identical with Nel Nodding’s position in her earlier work, which, as we saw in Chapter 5, is always open to the objection that the ground of caring for anything in particular can be nothing but the fact that one does care for it? If we happen to care about the future of a particular ideal, place, institution or something else, why should this either give us a reason to care about the future more generally, or give others a reason to care for the same things we do? Is there anything, for example, that might compel us to recognise the ethical significance of any future span of time beyond that related to the specific attachments about which we do happen to care, even if these give us no reason to care about the future beyond the limit of our own lifespans? Is all future-oriented care equally morally praiseworthy? If connectedness is conducive to human flourishing, then does it matter what is cared for? I might find the consumption of luxury goods and defending ideals of consumer sovereignty very fulfilling, on the basis that they help establish meaningful status differences and thus contribute to my sense of identity.