Aristotelian Representations II

Part of the New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science book series (NDPCS)


After collecting together the discussion so far, this chapter addresses the question of Aristotelian representations in cognitive neuroscience. Doing so involves looking not just at actual cases, but also considering the changes we need to make more generally in interpretative expectations. For example, we want to think about at least a range of cognitive successes as not involving content, aboutness or truth. For contemporary thinkers, that may involve quite a readjustment; how can one have cognition without content and truth-conditions, or at least satisfaction conditions? Accordingly, the project being proposed takes on very serious theoretical debts, and the final section looks at the motivations one can have for engaging in the venture.


Cognitive Neuroscience Anterior Insula Ordinary Language Satisfaction Condition Mental Causation 
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Copyright information

© Anne Jaap Jacobson 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of HoustonUSA

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