Abstract
This chapter makes the case against the general applicability of a standard view of action explanation. On the standard view, Fodorian mental representations provide the propositional attitudes that are our reasons for acting. In such an account, there is often an implicit appeal to a Davidsonian conception (Davidson, 2001; Schlosser, 2011). Reasons for action consist of a belief and desire (in some very general sense of those words) that cause the action, where the belief and desire are of the form: I believe that if I do X then I will get Y; I want Y.
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© 2013 Anne Jaap Jacobson
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Jacobson, A.J. (2013). Actions, Emotions and Beliefs, Part II. In: Keeping the World in Mind. New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137315588_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137315588_11
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-33388-2
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-31558-8
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