Actions, Emotions and Beliefs, Part II

Part of the New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science book series (NDPCS)


This chapter makes the case against the general applicability of a standard view of action explanation. On the standard view, Fodorian mental representations provide the propositional attitudes that are our reasons for acting. In such an account, there is often an implicit appeal to a Davidsonian conception (Davidson, 2001; Schlosser, 2011). Reasons for action consist of a belief and desire (in some very general sense of those words) that cause the action, where the belief and desire are of the form: I believe that if I do X then I will get Y; I want Y.


Cognitive Neuroscience Propositional Attitude High Functioning Autist Folk Psychology Helpful Action 
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Copyright information

© Anne Jaap Jacobson 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of HoustonUSA

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