Actions, Emotions and Beliefs, Part I

Part of the New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science book series (NDPCS)


In Chapters 1, 6, and 7, we discussed reasons for thinking that a very standard model of mental representations should be separated frommuch of what is going on today in building a science of the mind. To be sure, there may be heuristic reasons to talk about what a neural signal is saying or to regard a burst of neural activity as about some episode in the environment. Nonetheless, such talk has a price to pay to be legitimate in a science of the mind. The price is high, and we have seen good reasons to think that current theories of content cannot pay it.


Natural Kind Emotional Contagion Propositional Attitude Intentional Content Discrete Emotion 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Anne Jaap Jacobson 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of HoustonUSA

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