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Building the House?: James Buchanan

  • Philip Abbott
Chapter
Part of the The Evolving American Presidency Series book series (EAP)

Abstract

Certainly, the strongest element of Lincoln’s case is the “James” segment of his conspiracy charge. Whether he acted in concert with “Franklin” is debatable. His open antipathy to “Stephen” is legendary. Nevertheless, the connection with “Roger” seems to be broadly correct and Buchanan’s policies as president, from his stated willingness in his inaugural address to “cheerfully submit” to the Supreme Court’s impending decision to his very last acts, do suggest the possibility of a plan to nationalize slavery or accept Southern secession.

Keywords

Foreign Policy Democratic Party Republican Party Supreme Court Decision Inaugural Address 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    Michael A. Genovese, The Power of the American Presidency ( New York: Oxford University Press, 2001 ), p. 77;Google Scholar
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  3. Allan Nevins, Prologue to the Civil War (New York: Knopf, 1974), vol. 2, p. 210.Google Scholar
  4. 2.
    Michael Birkner, “Getting to Know Buchanan, Again,” in Michael Birkner, ed., James Buchanan and the Political Crisis of the 1850s ( Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press ), p. 17.Google Scholar
  5. 3.
    Charles F. Faber and Richard B. Faber, The American Presidents Ranked by Performance (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Co., 2000), p. 118. Faber and Faber rank Buchanan twenty-fifth.Google Scholar
  6. 4.
    Samuel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History of the American People ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1965 ), p. 593;Google Scholar
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  8. 6.
    Philip Shriver Klein, President James Buchanan: A Biog raphy (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania Sate University Press, 1962 ), p. 253.Google Scholar
  9. 13.
    James F. Simon, Lincoln and Chief Justice Taney ( New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006 ), p. 114.Google Scholar
  10. 14.
    See, Robert K. Carr, The Supreme Court and Judicial Review ( New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942 );Google Scholar
  11. Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy (New York: Alfred P. Knopf, 1941). Don. E. Fehrenbacher, however, demurs stating that hostility between the regions was so pronounced that the narrower decision originally drafted would not have altered subsequent events. The Dred Scott Case (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978 ), p. 562. Mark Graber from a different perspective defends the decision on constitutional, though not moral terms, and implies that its rejection, particularly by Lincoln, was a violation of constitutional norms. Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil ( Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008 ).Google Scholar
  12. 15.
    Janis Lull, King Richard III ( Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999 ), p. 85.Google Scholar
  13. 19.
    James Buchanan, Mr. Buchanan’s Administration on the Eve of the Rebellion ( New York: Appleton and Co., 1865 ), pp. 232–39.Google Scholar
  14. 22.
    Elbert B. Smith, The Presidency of James Buchanan ( Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1975 ), p. 69.Google Scholar
  15. 30.
    Allan Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1959), vol. II, p. 360.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Philip Abbott 2013

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  • Philip Abbott

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