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Economic Theories that Influenced the Judges of Karlsruhe

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Managing Risks in the European Periphery Debt Crisis

Abstract

On 14 January 2014 the German judges of the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe came to a preliminary ruling: the European Central Bank’s government bond buying programme (OMT) is illegal according to EU law. The judges referred the case to the European Court of Justice, asking the Luxembourg judges to add conditions to the OMT programme to make it possible for them to reconsider their judgement. These conditions, if implemented, would in fact rob the OMT programme of its effectiveness and make it totally useless. This would create the risk of repeated crises in the government bond markets of the eurozone.

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© 2015 Paul De Grauwe

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De Grauwe, P. (2015). Economic Theories that Influenced the Judges of Karlsruhe. In: Christodoulakis, G. (eds) Managing Risks in the European Periphery Debt Crisis. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137304957_6

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