Abstract
A crisis decision involves “a response to a high threat to values, either immediate or long range, where there is little time for decision under conditions of surprise.”1 North Korea’s surprise decision in June 1950 to cross the 38th parallel dividing it from South Korea placed the administration of Harry Truman in a crisis mode. It compelled the president to make two distinct decisions. Shortly after the invasion, Truman had to decide whether to assist South Korea militarily. His decision to help led to the implementation of a UN military counterattack under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. After the UN forces pushed the North Korean troops to retreat to their homeland, Truman faced a second critical decision: Whether to allow MacArthur’s forces to cross the 38th parallel in an attempt to unify the Korean peninsula under a regime friendly to the United States. Despite being forewarned by China that it would not tolerate such an act, Truman authorized MacArthur and his forces to march into North Korea. China responded with a massive attack. A costly war of attrition ensued. On July 27, 1953, the parties involved in the conflict signed an armistice agreement. The two Koreas remained divided.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision: June 24–30, 1950 (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 276.
See Ronald Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR and the Successor States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 352–3. As Suny notes, the Soviet ambassador in Washington had also sent his own “long telegram” to Moscow in which he states that the United States was striving for “world dominance.”
Dennis D. Wainstock, Truman, MacArthur and the Korean War (New York: Enigma Books, 1999), 4.
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 2: Years of Trial and Hope (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956), 267.
Ronald McGlothlen, “Acheson, Economics, and the American Commitment in Korea, 1947–1950,” in Pacific Historical Review, vol. 58, no. 1 (1989): 34.
Russell D. Buhite, “Major Interests: American Policy toward China, Taiwan and Korea, 1945–1950,” in Pacific Historical Review, vol. 46, no. 3 (August 1978): 446.
Merle Miller, Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman (New York: Berkley Publishing Corporation, 1973), 268.
Robert J. Donovan, Nemesis: Truman and Johnson in the Coils of War in Asia (New York: St. Martin’s-Marek, 1984), 18.
James I. Matray, “Truman’s Plan for Victory: National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eight Parallel Decision in Korea,” in The Journal of American History, vol. 66, no. 2 (September 1979): 316.
John J. Muccio, “Military Aid to Korean Security Forces,” Department of State Bulletin, XXII (June 26, 1950), 1.
William Whitney Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947–1950 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 153.
O. H. P. Kin, Tail of the Paper Tiger (Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, 1961), 331.
Barton Bernstein, “The Truman Administration and the Korean War,” in The Truman Presidency, ed. Michael J. Lacey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 442.
Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990), 162.
Christen L. Tomlinson, “Decision Making and the Invasion at Inchon,” file:///Users/ccuser/Desktop/Decision%20Making%20and%20the%20Invasion%20 at%20Ichon.html#ChristenTomlinson96_12.
Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 447.
D. Clayton James and Anne Sharp Wells, Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea 1950–1953 (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 169.
Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade: America 1945–1955 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 166–7.
Janis, Groupthink, 68. See also Phillip M. Johnson, “Effects of Groupthink on Tactical Decision-Making,” A Monograph. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2001).
Copyright information
© 2014 Alex Roberto Hybel
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hybel, A.R. (2014). Harry Truman and the Decisions to Intervene in the Korean War and to Cross the 38th Parallel. In: US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Truman to Kennedy. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137294869_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137294869_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-45163-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-29486-9
eBook Packages: Palgrave Intern. Relations & Development CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)