Shareholder Optimism

Shareholders’ Expectations, Aspiration Levels and Mergers
  • Enrico Diecidue
  • Jeroen van de Ven
  • Utz Weitzel

Abstract

In the last two decades, significant resources have been spent on corporate mergers. At the beginning of the 1980s, US mergers and acquisitions (M&As) amounted to an average of 3.6% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) (Weston et al., 2004). By 1995, M&A activity has reached 5% of GDP and equated to about 48% of non-residential gross investment (Andrade et al., 2001). Records peaked in 1999 at 15.4% of GDP (Weston et al., 2004) and even after the downturn that followed in the USA a total of $1.24 trillion (and $2.56 trillion globally) changed hands in 2006 alone.

Keywords

Gross Domestic Product Financial Economic Agency Cost Internal Project Aspiration Level 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Enrico Diecidue, Jeroen van de Ven and Utz Weitzel 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Enrico Diecidue
  • Jeroen van de Ven
  • Utz Weitzel

There are no affiliations available

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