Passing the Mladić Test

Abstract

Despite its lack of progress on the apprehension of Ratko Mladić, and contrary to all predictions, Serbia was invited, along with Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Montenegro, to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace, at the Riga Summit, on 29 November 2006.¹ The Partnership for Peace accession was hailed as a major triumph for Serbian diplomacy, and was greeted with relief by the more reform minded elements in the military.² It was an important step on Serbia’s road to democracy and integration. It was expected that membership would provide Serbia with increased assistance in defence reform matters, helping it to tackle restructuring and reform, and building a more efficient system of defence management. Partnership for Peace membership would open the door to increased cooperation with NATO and Partner countries, as well as providing necessary support in pursuing reforms. However, the Secretary General of NATO warned Serbia that its membership carried the obligation to cooperate fully with the ICTY, and that NATO would continue to monitor the progress of this cooperation.³ However, Serbia’s perspective on NATO remained ambiguous, at least, a legacy of the 1999 conflict over Kosovo. There was no groundswell of popular support for joining the Alliance, in contrast to the rest of Central and East Europe. The EU was a different matter, however. Joining the EU was seen as re-joining Europe and would represent Serbia’s rehabilitation from the shadows of the Milošević era, war and war crimes.