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Building States, Building Peace pp 55–88Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Evolution of the Sri Lankan Conflict Up to 2002

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Part of the book series: Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies ((RCS))

Abstract

The emphasis in this book is on external third-party involvement in the Sri Lankan conflict and how this played out vis-à-vis the warring parties. The different natures of the external actors involved throughout the country’s conflict defined the type of influence they had over the parties. Arthur C. Clarke, a world-renowned writer living in Sri Lanka, did not envisage the need for outside involvement for his country of adoption to ‘return to normalcy’ and for the ‘grounds for conflict’ to be eliminated forever.

For material progress and economic growth would come to nothing if we allow the primitive forces of territoriality and aggression to rule our minds … I am optimistic that the land that has shown tremendous resilience over the centuries and practiced a rare type of tolerance could still return to normalcy — although we should ensure that grounds for conflict are eliminated forever.1

Sri Lanka, then called Ceylon, was under British colonial rule till 1948; thereafter the regional power, India, and most recently non-regional actors became officially involved in the island’s conflict, which was internationalized from its inception. India has been a permanent factor in the Sri Lankan conflict, both in its role as regional power and based on its ethnic links with the island nation: a spillover effect has been one of New Delhi’s concerns ever since, as noted in Chapter 2. A distinction is made here between the historical internationalization of the conflict and targeted external engagement in Sri Lanka’s successive conflict resolution initiatives: however, these are interdependent and evolved in tandem with the dynamics of the conflict.

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Notes

  1. Interview given by Sir Arthur C. Clarke to the Sunday Observer Magazine, The Sunday Observer, 14 December 1997.

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  40. This was clearly articulated in a press release issued by Indian Ministry of External Affairs on 31 August 1985. L. Ketheshwaran (2006) ‘Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and the Ethnic Question: Lessons and Experiences’ in K. Rupesinghe (ed.) Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, Failures & Lessons, Vol. 1 (Colombo: Foundation for Co-Existence).

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© 2014 Amaia Sánchez-Cacicedo

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Sánchez-Cacicedo, A. (2014). Evolution of the Sri Lankan Conflict Up to 2002. In: Building States, Building Peace. Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137274168_3

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